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Abstract 
As a consequence of the EU Nitrates Directive many countries have developed policies to 
regulate manure production and manure emission on land. Farmers have three allocation 
options: spreading manure on own land, transporting manure to other farmers’ land and 
processing manure. To better understand the manure problem as an allocation problem a 
spatial mathematical programming multi-agent model has been developed. The model is 
applied for Flanders (Belgium), a highly concentrated livestock area. Using this model, policy 
alternatives and their cost efficiency can be evaluated. These simulations result in advice on 
location and type of manure processing and an indicator which creates transparency in the 
manure and processing market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
In recent decades manure became an important issue of livestock production in many 
Western-European countries. Manure is seen as a ‘bad’ thing (Lewis 2008) or as an 
undesirable by-product of livestock production (Huhtala & Marklund 2008). In countries like 
the Netherlands, Belgium (mainly in Flanders) and parts of France and Italy, where animal 
production is very concentrated, more manure is produced per unit of farmland than what may 
be distributed in compliance with legal provisions. In Flanders, which will be used as case in 
this research, the quantity of nitrogen (N) produced per hectare of land was more than 260 kg 
in 1991 (Vervaet et al. 2004). Due to policy interventions, N-production has been reduced to 
200 kg per hectare of land in 2006. The strong growth in livestock production was possible 
due to the import of feed compounds from elsewhere in the world. The inexpensive 
availability of imported feed favoured the growth of the livestock production in regions close 
to sea-ports (Feinerman & Komen 2005). This dependency of livestock production on sea-
ports induced the development of two regions with highly concentrated animal production in 
Flanders. One is located in the western part of Flanders (the province of West-Flanders), with 
the adjacent sea-port of Ghent (with further tranships to the inland port of Roeselare, which is 
central to the livestock production area) and the other in the northern part of Flanders (the 
province of Antwerp), close to the sea-port of Antwerp.  
 
Before 1991, without any policy intervention, the produced nutrients from animal production 
were mostly disposed of on the farmers’ own land. The farmers did not face incentives to bear 
the extra cost of transporting manure to other regions. They even benefited from the increased 
crop yield due to the very high fertilisation based on manure (Nesme et al. 2005). Both the 
excessive  manure application and the limited nutrient uptake by crops increased the nutrient 
concentration in the soil. Because of nitrate and phosphate leaching from the soil, surface- and 
groundwater were polluted with nutrients (Withers & Haygarth 2007). 
 
In 1991, the European Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)
1
 introduced the 50 mg nitrate per litre 
water standard and obliged the regional or national governments to take action against an 
excessive use of manure and other fertilizers.  In many countries, this  water quality standard 
resulted in fertilization standards. Farms with more manure production than the fertilization 
standards allow for use on their own land, needed to transport manure to farms with deficit on 
manure. In regions where overall production exceeds deficits, the farmer needs three 
possibilities to get rid of the produced manure: (1) using the manure on his own land, (2) 
transporting it to other (deficit) farms or (3) processing or exporting the manure. The first and 
second option are limited by the fertilization standards and by lack of full acceptance of 
manure within  the capacity determined by the fertilization standards. In Flanders (2006), only 
72.5% of produced manure is accepted, whereas the standards would allow 100%. As a result, 
the quantity of manure which could not be disposed of on land, must be processed or 
exported. Despite the fact that manure transport is running to its limits, the processing 
capacity has not yet sufficiently been developed to solve the manure problem. A major 
problem in this development of the processing capacity is the uncertainty about the manure 
surplus evolution and related disposal costs.  
 
The regional concentration of animal production is very diverse and, together with high 
transportation costs, this creates huge spatial differences in the demand for manure 
processing. The interplay between transportation and processing, determines where demand 
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 The main purpose of the directive was to protect the waters against pollution caused by nitrates from 
agricultural sources  
for processing capacity will arise. Various models have been made in the past to describe this 
interplay (e.g. De Mol & Van Beeck (1991), Lauwers (1993), Lauwers et al. (1998), ...). 
However, these models were mostly too aggregated (e.g. manure transport was simulated on 
regional level) and normative and ignored insights in the actual fertilization behaviour of the 
farmers. 
 
The objective of the current paper is to present a comprehensive manure allocation model that 
combines the location choice of processing plants with individual farmer’s perceived 
behaviour on manure production, manure disposition, manure transport and manure supply to 
possible processors. The methodology of this spatial mathematical programming model is 
based on a multi-agent simulation system (MP-MAS) applied to a dataset containing the 
complete farm population in Flanders  (38.777 farms).  
 
The paper is worked out as follows. First the modelling aspects of the manure allocation 
problem are explained with a detailed description of all aspects of manure production, manure 
spreading, manure processing and manure transport. Next a description of the dataset is given 
followed by the results section. Finally, some conclusions about the model and the results are 
discussed. In particular, strengths and shortcomings are discussed of the benefits and pitfalls 
of spatial mathematical programming for analysis of environmental and regional planning 
decisions applied to the case of the optimal location of manure processing capacity in 
Flanders. 
2 Modelling the manure allocation problem 
2.1 Description of the manure allocation model 
Most environmental problems, such as the manure surplus, involve decisions at different 
levels. At the micro or farm level, the farmer decides to produce manure and to use, to 
transport or to process it. The aggregation of these numerous decisions results in a manure 
supply and demand at the macro or regional level. The decisions at micro-level both influence 
and depend on the conditions at macro or regional level. In other words, manure supply and 
demand at aggregated level influence and depend on micro level decisions to transport or 
process. The interaction between farms as decision making agents, i.e. competition for 
manure disposal space, is thus an important issue. This means that spatial differentiation plays 
an important role. The manure production and the availability of land to dispose of the 
manure are regionally diverse and create completely different conditions for micro-level 
decision makers depending on their location.  
Classical mathematical programming models that fail to capture the interaction between 
agents are thus not able to simulate farmer behaviour in a heterogeneous environment (Berger 
2001; Boulanger & Brechet 2005). Obviously, multi-agent-systems (MAS) would be a better 
simulation option. With MAS artificial micro-worlds can be constructed in which all the 
parameters, both at the micro and the macro level, can be controlled in a spatial context 
(Courdier et al. 2002). The micro-level part of the MAS- system is represented by 
Mathematical Programming (MP) which simulates the farmer as a decision-making subject 
taking into account legal and other constraints. The use of MP at the core of the decision-
making procedure is suitable to capture agent heterogeneity and economic trade-offs while, at 
the same time it focuses on constraints which have a clear link to policy relevant questions 
(Schreinemachers & Berger 2006).  
 
MP has also been integrated in MAS by several other researchers, for instance by Berger 
(2001), Becu et al. (2003), Schreinemachers et al. (2007) and Valbuena et al. (2008). Berger 
(2001) and Becu et al. (2003) have applied MAS on the water management problem. 
Schreinemacher et al. (2007) have used a bio-economic MAS to simulate changes in 
soilfertility and poverty in Uganda and Valbuena et al.(2008) have simulated changes in land 
use by means of a MAS. All these former applications deal with the similar problem of 
individual decisions on utilisation of limited resources where the increase in use of the 
resource by one decision maker affects the availability of that resource for the other decision 
makers. The studies deal with small scale applications or are based on samples. To the 
authors’ knowledge, the MP-MAS approach has not yet been applied to a simulation with a 
large population of more than 38,000 individual decision makers.  
 
The following subsections describe the details of the MP-MAS model. First the  the micro-
level constraints of decision making are descirbed: production of manure (1.2), disposal of 
manure on own land (1.3) and manure processing (1.4). This is followed by the description of 
macro-level interactions between farms through manure exchange by transports (1.5). The 
final subsection describes the cost calculation of the objective function (1.6).  
2.2 Production of manure 
Manure production and its nutrient content is very complicated to calculate because these 
variables not only depend on the number of animals but also on the feeding techniques, the 
production process, the type and the age of the animals. In a policy context, this complexity of 
nutrient production estimations is reduced by using generally fixed excretion standards for 
each type of animal
2
. Deviations from these excretion norms are possible when the farmer can 
prove that he uses different feeding techniques which causes his animals to excrete less than 
average, e.g. when making use of nutrient-poor feed. Furthermore, the nutrient production is 
also corrected for the ammonium losses during storage. In the model, these policy rules are 
applied for calculating the manure production because the farm primarily acts upon the 
incentives of the policy based on these calculations.  
 
Despite the fact that the model cannot fully account for farm specific differences in manure 
volume and quality, the model is able to distinguish the four major types of manure: cattle, 
pigs, poultry and other. Equation 1 then calculates the manure production of farm f for manure 
type m (Pmf). 
 
lplp
l p
mf excrnP *  ml  (1) 
with nlp being the number of animals of animal type l using feeding technique p and excrlp 
being the corresponding excretion standard per animal.  
 
2.3 Disposing manure on own farmland  
A limited amount of the produced nutrients can be spread on the land according to the type of 
fertilizers, crop category
3
 and area
4
. With this disposal constraint, the manure decree actually 
created a system of tradable emission rights for manure (Lauwers et al. 2003). This labelling 
is justified because manure use, given the imperfect incorporation of nutrient inputs into end 
products, jointly entails a nutrient emission (Buysse et al. 2008). Different from other systems 
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Animal type: combination of species and age  
3
 The manure regulation has subdivided crops into four different categories (grassland, maize, low nitrogen crops 
and other crops) 
4
 In the manure regulations distinction is made between general areas and several vulnerable areas ( e.g. water, 
nature, phosphorus saturated areas)  
of tradable emission rights, the right (the land) is linked to a fixed location and the emissions 
(manure) are tradable while for most other emission rights the emissions can not be traded and 
the rights are not linked to location. In fact, land entails a right to spread manure and both the 
land and the manure itself are tradable between farms but only the manure can be moved.  
 
In the case of the Flemish manure legislation the total use of nutrients is constrained by four 
types of emission rights. The use of organic nitrogen (N) and inorganic nitrogen are each 
bounded by a maximum norm. Moreover the joint use of both nitrogen types is also limited. 
The fourth emission right limits the  use of phosphorus (P2O5). In this paper only the three 
constraints regarding nitrogen use are taken into account because nitrogen is currently the 
most binding nutrient.  
 
The basic idea of the Flemish manure policy is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the structure of the manure legislation 
 
The right to dispose manure on own land depends on the number of hectares and the 
corresponding fertilization standards. For each combination of crop category and area an 
fertilization standard is fixed. The general fertilization standards are given in Fout! 
Verwijzingsbron niet gevonden.. 
  
 
The farm' emission rights (Rf) are implemented in the model by equation (2) 

a
caca
c
f hnormR *          (2) 
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Fixed Excretion norms per animal type 
Fixed fertilization norms per crop category and area 
where hca is the number of hectares of the farm per crop category c and area a and normca is 
the fertilization standard for crop category c in area a. The emission rights are calculated for 
the three different nitrogen quota. Rof is the farm emission right for organic nitrogen, Rif is the 
farm emission right for inorganic nitrogen and Raf is the farm emission right for total nitrogen. 
  
Equation (2) is expressed as if the available manure disposal space can and would always be 
met precisely. In reality, emission rights, quota or other constraints are often not exactly 
binding because of uncertainty about the production and the availability of rights and 
differences in risk behaviour of farms (Buysse et al., 2008). As it is important to use the actual 
farmer’s fertilizing behaviour in simulations, the available emission rights are calibrated to the 
current use of these rights. Two calibration calculations are used for the cases of over 
fertilisation and for the under fertilisation behaviour.  
 
In 2006, many farms disposed more nutrients on their land than legally allowed by their 
available emission rights because they did not succeed in processing the manure or in 
exchanging the manure with another farm. Despite the penalties introduced by the manure 
decree, this over fertilisation still exists because the manure processing capacity has not yet 
developed sufficiently. For the case of over fertilisation the calibration sets the emission rights 
equal to the legal emission rights.  
Other farms do not completely use their available quota for organic manure despite the fact 
the surplus farms are willing to pay to manure deficit farms, in some regions more than 300 
euro per ha for manure disposal. One of the reasons for not completely using the organic 
manure quota is that some farmers prefer inorganic to organic fertiliser for certain crops 
(Feinerman & Komen 2005; Van der Straeten et al. 2008). Because we assume that farmers 
will continue this behaviour and thus use less organic manure than legally allowed the 
calibration in the current case sets the emission rights in the model equal to the legal emission 
rights minus the emission rights that are left unused .  
 
Based on the calibrated emission rights, equations 3 – 5 describe the legal part of disposing 
manure on own land.  
 
 
m
ofmf RU            (3) 
ifif RU             (4) 
 
m
afifmf RUU           (5) 
Where Umf is the quantity of manure disposed on the land and Uif the quantity of chemical 
manure used on land. The use of both types of nitrogen is limited to the respective individual 
emission right and the joint emission right. In the model the farmer can only optimise his 
fertilization behaviour by changing the organic manure allocation. Because of the fixed 
chemical nitrogen use, only equation (3) and (5) are relevant. As long as the chemical 
fertilizer use is low enough, equation (3) is the binding constraint. With higher chemical 
fertilizer doses, the allocation of organic nitrogen will be limited by equation (5) (Van der 
Straeten et al. 2008). 
2.4 Modelling the manure processing 
A second manure allocation option is to process the manure. Distinction has been made 
between legally obliged processing and market driven processing. Obligatory processing is 
directly imposed by the manure regulation because the policy does not give the farm the 
option to compete for on-land disposal. Each farm with a production of more than 10,000 kg 
phosphorus and all farms in a municipality with a production of 100 P2O5/ha and an own 
production of more than 7,500 kg phosphorus, are obliged to process some percentage of the 
farm manure surplus. This percentage depends on the total phosphorus production at the farm.  
Farms that produce manure without being able to dispose of it within the legal limits on own 
land or to exchange it with other farms have to process the manure as well. This market 
driven processing is thus not directly imposed by law but it is, however, a consequence of the 
manure disposal limits on land.  
 
The introduction of processing as an alternative to disposing on land creates the balancing 
problem in the manure allocation model. Equation (6) imposes that the allocation problem 
stays balanced during the simulation procedure. The disposition  of manure of type m (Umf ) is 
equal to the sum of the production of the manure at the farm (Pmf ) plus the incoming manure 
(Imf ) minus the outgoing manure (Emf ) minus the processed amount of manure (PRmf ). The 
balance between the two variables that depend on the interaction between other farms, are 
described in next section.  
 
mfmfmfmfmf PREIPU         (6) 
2.5 Manure transport 
All previous policy driven constraints can be simulated at individual farm level without 
considering interactions between the farms. However, modelling the transport of manure 
creates the challenge of simulating interactions between farms.  
 
Modelling the interaction between farms for manure exchange is different from other quota 
markets such as dairy quota, sugar quota or CO2-emission rights. Despite the fact that in 
reality strong rigidities and transaction costs exist in these quota markets, their modelling is 
often based on a perfect market for quota rights (Mahler 1994; Bureau et al. 1997; Fraser et al. 
1997; Brannlund et al. 1998; Alvarez et al. 2006; Van Passel et al. 2006).  
 
The main difference with the aforementioned quotas is that, for the manure problem, 
emissions are tradable and the rights are locally fixed, while in contrast, for the CO2-emission 
rights and most other quota markets, emissions are not tradable while the rights are. Because 
of the tradability of manure emissions, transport costs of manure play an important role as 
they create a spatial difference in willingness to pay and thus the market price for manure 
disposal.  
 
The simulation of each farm in the population and their interactions removes all possible 
sampling errors. However,  it complicates the computation of finding optimal solutions in a 
large population as the needed computer capacity increases severely. Our dataset of 38,777 
farms and 4 types of manure would, for instance, result in a transport matrix of 6,014,622,916 
cells. To tackle this large number of cells, a hypothetical transport firm for each municipality 
was introduced. The transport firm acts as an assembly point where each farm of the 
respective municipality can offer its excess or collect its demand of manure.  
 
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the working of the municipal transport firm 
  
Figure 2 shows the example for the transport firm of municipality 1. This municipality has n 
farms. Instead of allowing interaction between these n farms with the whole population, only 
interaction with the municipal transport firm is taken into account. The interactions with 
farms of other municipalities are lifted to the higher level where only the interactions between 
the municipality transport firms are simulated. The model optimises both the transports within 
the municipality and the transports between the municipalities.  
 
Working with municipal transport firms lowers the number of cells  in the transport matrix but 
does not violate the optimization at farm level. The individual farm still decides whether 
transport of manure is desirable or not. Once these optimal levels are determined at farm 
level, the optimization of the exchange of manure between the different municipalities occurs 
at transport firm level. The transport firm itself is only a tool for allowing optimal exchange 
over the whole Flemish region and results have proven that the outcome is identical to a 
simulation where all farms interact directly with each other while the transport matrix 
contains only 1232*1232 cells.  
 
The transport behaviour of the farms is integrated into the equations (7) to (9). 
mfmft PE            (7) 
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with Emft being the amount of exported manure of manure type m from the farm to transport 
firm t, Imft the amount of incoming manure of manure type m at the farm from transport firm t 
and Tmt1t2 the amount of manure of manure type m transported from transport firm t1 to 
transport firm t2. Constraint (7) prevents the amount of exported manure from exceeding the 
produced manure of each manure type. Equation (8) imposes that all the exported manure of 
the individual farms to their respective transport firms is also exported out of these firms to 
A 
B 
… 
N 
Transport firm 
municipality 1 
Transport firm 
municipality 308 
Transport firm 
… 
Transport firm 
municipality 3 
Transport firm 
municipality 2 
Municipality 1 
other transport firms (or the transport firm itself). Equation (9) does the same but at the 
incoming side. It imposes that the transport firm distributes its total received amount of 
manure to the respective individual farms.  
2.6 Costs calculation 
The final step in the model description is defining the objective function. As stated earlier, we 
assume that the farmer is a cost minimizing agent. The farmer has to choose among the three 
aforementioned allocation options. All three options involve costs (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: The costs for each allocation option (source: VCM – STIM (2004) and experts) 
Allocation options Used value 
Distribution costs (€/m³) 2.5 
Transport costs (€/km/m³) 0.18 
Processing costs (€/m³) 22.5 
 
Expressed to the volume, the costs are all assumed equal for each manure type. There is, 
however, a large difference in nitrogen content between the 4 types of manure. As the model 
is driven by the nutrient standards, the costs per kg of nutrient need to be taken into account 
(Table 2). 
Table 2: Average nitrogen content per m³ (kg N/ m³) 
Manure type Used value (*) 
Cattle 4.95 
Pigs 6.91 
Poultry 15.89 
Other  4.14 
* within the 4 types of manure the N-content varies among the different animal types. Therefore, the used 
value is the weighted average N-content of all produced manure in Flanders (source: own calculations) 
 
The allocation results will resort from the differences in costs between the three allocation 
options and the differences in nitrogen content between the four types of manure.. The 
distribution option (i.e. disposing the manure on own farm's land) is the cheapest option. 
When all the available emission rights are used, the farmer will search for available emission 
rights on other farms. The final option is to process the manure. Manure from poultry has the 
highest nitrogen content, followed by pigs. Consequently, transport costs and processing costs 
expressed per kg N will be the lowest for poultry. As a result the farmer will choose to 
process manure in the following order of manure type: poultry, pigs, other and cattle.  
Equations (10) to (12) calculate the costs of the different manure allocation options. 
 
mummf
m
uf contentNtUC _/cos*        (10) 
mPRmmf
m
PRf contentNtPRC _/cos*        (11) 
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with costum being the costs to dispose of 1 m³ manure of type m on own land, costPRm the costs 
to process 1 m³ manure of type m, costem the costs to transport 1 m³ manure of type m over 1 
km and N_contentm the N content per m³ of manure of type m. Cuf and CPRf are the total 
disposal and processing costs of the farm, respectively, while Ct is the total cost of the 
transport firm t.  
  
The final phase in constructing the model is to define the objective function (equation (13)). 
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3 Data 
The data base is set up by the Flemish Land Agency (FLA). It contains all variables related to 
production, transactions, acquisitions and use of nutrients for each Flemish farm individually. 
The total dataset consists 60,577 farms over a period of seven years (2000-2006) with a total 
of 311,430 unbalanced panel observations. For the current paper only farms with more than 2 
hectares or a nutrient production of more than 300 kg phosphorus in the year 2006 were taken 
into account. The used sample consists of 38,777 farms. Table 3 shows the aggregated figures 
of the total emission rights and the nutrient excretion in the sample.  
 
Table 3: Aggregated figures regarding the production and use of organic nitrogen in Flanders in 2006 
(source: own calculations) 
variable Value  
Total used emission right for organic nitrogen (kg N) 102,093,402 
Actual production of organic nitrogen (kg N) 128,495,690  
Production surplus of organic nitrogen (kg N) 26,402,288  
 
In 2006 102 million emission rights for organic nitrogen (kg N) are used in practice. This 
means 72.5% of the theoretically available emission rights for organic nitrogen. In practice, 
Flanders is not able to dispose of 26.4 million kg out of these 102 million kg of nitrogen on 
farmland. As only 16.3 million kg is processed or exported, there was an over fertilization of 
10.1 million kg nitrogen exists.  
4 Model results 
The proposed model and the dataset can be used for different applications in manure 
management choices, policy evaluations and investment decision support analysis. First, the 
model is used to evaluate policy alternatives and their impact on costs of manure allocation. 
Second, the model supports investment decisions by advising on location and type of manure 
processing. The simulations compare the existing manure processing capacity with the 
optimal demand. The model results indicate whether the development of manure processing 
capacity so far is efficiently located. Taking the already existing capacity into account new 
simulations show where more investments in processing capacity are needed. Finally, the 
model produces results for an indicator that creates transparency in the manure transport and 
processing market.   
4.1 Policy analysis 
 
The first applications of the model are straightforward calculations of the impact of policy 
choices on sector parameters. The effect of the legally obliged manure processing on the total 
manure allocation costs is taken here as an example. The manure policy tries to cool down the 
manure market by imposing a processing obligation on the largest manure surplus farms. 
Moreover this enables the policy makers to steer the development of manure processing. The 
model is used to investigate whether this attempt is cost effective. The total cost for manure 
allocation with the obliged manure processing is compared to the situation where only market 
driven processing is simulated (Table 5 and Table 6). 
  
Table 4: the simulated allocation choices compared between market driven manure processing and legally 
obliged processing 
 cattle pig poultry other 
Nitrogen production 67,692,272 45,660,663 12,707,607 2,435,148 
Market driven processing option     
Simulated total disposed N 67,692,272 31,305,954 660,028 2,435,148 
Simulated transported N 10,525,939 26,336,283 1,048,555 316,072 
Simulated (market driven) 
processed N 
0 14,354,708 12,047,579 0 
Legally obliged processing option    
Simulated total disposed N 67,162,008 31,311,969 1,191,750 2,427,675 
Simulated transported N 7,484,268 18,985,347 1,159,665 575,205 
Obligatory processed N 530,264 7,143,193 4,928,395 7,473 
Simulated (market driven) 
processed N 
0 7,205,501 6,587,461  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: total costs per allocation option compared between market driven manure processing and legally 
obliged processing 
 No legally obliged processing Legally obliged processing 
Disposal costs 47,088,682 46,902,192 
Transport costs 8,967,519 9,874,928 
Processing costs 63,800,281 65,478,693 
Total costs 119,856,482 122,255,812 
 
In the case of market driven processing, the individual decision makers in the model will 
optimise the location and the type of manure processing to meet the nitrogen fertilization 
restrictions. This increased freedom for the individual decision makers lowers the total cost of 
manure allocation with 2,399,330 euro with the same amount of nitrogen used on the land 
according to the fertilization standards. The model shows that the policy indicator for steering 
manure processing is thus not at all efficient.  
 
More than 20% of the nitrogen from manure has to be processed or exported, which creates 
also a great cost for the manure surplus farms. Therefore, it is important to search for the most 
cost efficient policy and investments for optimal manure allocation. Current subsection has 
shown how the policy could be improved, the next subsection shows how the use of MP-MAS 
as a planning instrument can help investors to obtain more benefits from manure processing 
by the development of the best type of plant on the optimal location.  
 
4.2 Investment decision support analysis 
 
In 2006, the total demand of manure processing was 26.40 million kg nitrogen (Table 5: sum 
of simulated obligatory and market driven processed N) while only 16.3 million kg nitrogen 
was effectively processed. This gap implies that there is an extra demand for manure 
processing of 10.1 million kg nitrogen. The model enables investors to determine where extra 
processing capacity is most desirable according to the stated objective.  
 
The lowest possible costs for the farmer (cost-efficient) and the highest benefit from the 
manure processor is reached by optimizing the location of the processing systems and the type 
of manure that can be processed. Implementing capacity close to the farms demanding extra 
processing capacity lowers the transport distance to the processing system. The choice of type 
of manure is also very important because processing costs differ significantly among manure 
types.  
 
The results of model simulations of the optimal manure processing locations given the current 
policy are shown in figure 3. The figure shows actually the municipal manure surplus
5
 and 
thus the processing demand. In total 26.40 million kg must be processed in Flanders including 
both legally obliged and market driven manure processing. The location of the obliged 
processing is driven by the policy criteria and is spread quite evenly in Flanders. The market 
driven processing is only driven by the maximum fertilization limits on the land, production 
and economic motives of minimisation of transport and processing costs.  
 
Figure 3: The simulated municipal demand for manure processing in 2006 (kg N) 
 
However, the true situation differs from the optimal situation. A part of the demand for 
manure processing, illustrated in Figure 4, has already been realised by previous investments, 
not necessarily following the optimal allocation pattern. Currently, the operational processing 
capacity is almost 16.4 million kg N in Flanders.  
 
Figure 4: The actual municipal processing capacity in 2006 (kg N) 
 
Given the current situation, the new optimal location pattern must be updated. Therefore, the 
current capacity is brought into the model and a new simulation procedure is performed. The 
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 Surplus manure : manure which can not be disposed on own land or transported to other farms 
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result of the second simulation is given in  figure 5. Figure 5 shows that currently the best 
investment in terms of cost minimisation is the development of a pig manure processing plant 
in the centre of  West-Flanders.  
 
Figure 5: The simulated extra manure processing capacity per municipality in 2006 (kg N) 
 
4.3 Regional manure pressure indicator 
 
The reasons why the legally imposed processing is far from optimality (allocation costs: + 
2%) is to be found in the criteria on which obligatory manure processing is based. The current 
policy, steering the obligatory manure processing, uses an indicator based on a simple 
comparison of animal production and the number of hectares. This indicator is not very 
precise because it ignores the possibility of transport to neighbouring regions and disregards 
the fertilization behaviour of the farms. 
 
The needed processing capacity shown in figure 5 is already a much better indicator with 
more valuable information because it takes transports, type of manure and actual fertilising 
behaviour into account. However, figure 5 does not tell the decision maker how much the 
investment in processing capacity may cost and how much an individual farm may pay for 
manure disposal on land.  
 
Therefore, the model produces also a regional manure pressure indicator (RMPI). The RMPI 
is the dual value of the manure allocation equation (3) of the MP-MAS manure allocation 
model presented in this paper. This dual value gives the marginal cost of disposing 1 kg 
nitrogen. In regions with highly concentrated animal production and relatively low number of 
emission rights in their surroundings, this cost (dual value or regional manure pressure) is 
high. When competition for free emission rights is rather low, the regional manure pressure 
will be low as well. The regional manure pressure is given in figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Regional manure pressure in Flanders (2006) (€/kg) 
 
The RMPI is expressed in monetary terms and is therefore very relevant additional 
information for policy makers and manure processing investors. The RPMI shows the spatial 
distribution of the willingness to pay for manure processing. While figure 5 indicates for 
which capacity a manure processing demand exists, the RMPI also indicates the regional 
impact of the demand in monetary terms. In this way investors may decide to develop a larger 
capacity in a certain municipality than needed but fulfil the demand of farms from 
neighbouring municipalities with also a high RPMI.  
 
The RPMI can therefore also provide market information on transport of manure between 
farms. Better market information can make the market of transports more transparent because 
it clearly shows the maximum cost of disposing manure in each region.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The paper presents a model to simulate the impact and policies of spatially heterogeneous 
environmental pollution. The model is applied to the case of manure surplus in Flanders.  
As a result of the Nitrates Directive, manure allocation has been regulated very strictly by the 
Flemish government. The farmer has three possibilities to get rid of his manure: disposing on 
own land, transporting it to other farms and processing manure. The first two options are 
limited because of total emission rights on all Flemish farms. Manure is seen as an emission 
while land with the corresponding fertilization norm is seen as the right. In contrast to other 
emission rights, the right (land) is locally fixed and the emissions (manure) are tradable 
between farms.  
 
The environmental management of manure in Flanders has three typical features:   
i) The impact of environmental policies depends on interactions between the individual 
decision makers resulting in an interplay between micro (farm) and macro (regional) level. 
The decisions at micro level both influence and depend on the situation at macro level. This 
has led to a competition between farms for manure disposal space.  
ii) Environmental emissions are spatially diverse. The spatial pattern of manure emission from 
highly concentrated livestock production has developed from the reliance on imported feed. 
Pig and poultry farms located themselves near to sea-ports resulting in a high manure pressure 
in these regions.  
iii) Emission abatement technology is heterogeneous. The heterogeneity in manure abatement 
is driven by the differences in the sources of manure (type of animals) and the available sinks 
for manure (type of land and crops).  
 
The paper shows that these typical features of environmental management problems can be 
tackled by MP-MAS models. The manure allocation model works for the entire Flemish farm 
population (38,777 farms). The model is able to simulate the manure allocation behaviour of 
the individual farm in a normative way. The model is illustrated with an application on the 
dataset to simulate manure allocation management. First, the model is used to make policy 
evaluations. The effectiveness and efficiency of the legally obliged manure processing 
regulation is analysed. Next, the model is used to analyse investment decisions by showing 
the quantity of demand for manure processing in a spatial context. Finally, the manure 
pressure indicator is introduced to help both policy makers and private decision makers by 
providing market information on the spatial differentiation of the cost of environmental 
pollution.  
 
The results show that the current policy of steering the manure processing capacity is far from 
optimal, since the introduction of obligatory manure processing has an additional total cost of 
2,399,330 euro without any environmental benefits. With respect to investments in new 
manure processing capacity, the model clearly indicates the regions (e.g. West-Flanders) that 
need additional investments. The possible benefits from these investments can be derived 
from the regional manure pressure indicator because it gives in monetary terms the 
willingness to pay for manure disposal. The regional manure pressure indicator should also 
improve the market transparency to ameliorate the management of transport and processing in 
order to reach the same environmental objective in a more efficient way.  
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